Forum

TruthMove Forum

TruthMove Forum » TruthMove Main Forum

Paul Thompson Essays (2 posts)

  1. truthmod
    Administrator

    It's sad that these are probably only read by a handful of people, while thousands are exposed to controlled demolition sites and presentations.

    http://www.historycommons.org/essay.jsp?article=es...

    At a local mosque, Alhazmi and Almihdhar befriended Abdussattar Shaikh, a prominent member of the local Islamic community whose home has been a gathering spot for Middle Eastern men for two decades. [Los Angeles Times, 9/27/01] In September 2000, they accepted Shaikh’s invitation to live at his home. [Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01] Alhazmi stayed there until December, although Almihdhar left to go overseas in October. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01, San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/16/01] But Shaikh also happened to be a “tested” undercover “asset” working with the local FBI. Newsweek reported that the connection between these two and the informant “stunned some top counter-terrorism officials.” While the official account maintains that Shaikh never told the FBI the names of the two Saudis, Newsweek reported that one source recounted an incident in which “the case agent called up [Abdussattar Shaikh]… and was told he couldn’t talk because ‘Khalid’ a reference to Almihdhar was in the room.” [Newsweek, 9/9/02] Wouldn’t that imply that the FBI knew whom this Khalid being referred to was?

    Interestingly, the FBI has refused to allow the 9/11 Congressional inquiry to interview either Shaikh or his FBI contact. They say he would have nothing interesting to say, but the inquiry doesn’t agree. The Justice Department is also fighting the FBI to speak with him. [New York Times, 10/5/02]

    ...

    In October 2000, Yazid Sufaat, the owner of the condominium, signed letters identifying Zacarias Moussaoui as a representative of his wife’s company. [Reuters, 9/20/02, Washington Post, 2/3/02] These letters were essential in convincing the INS to allow Moussaoui into the US. On August 16, the day Moussaoui was arrested, FBI agents packed up all his possessions and took them into custody. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/24/02] Among these possessions were the letters tying Moussaoui to Sufaat and the meeting in his condominium. The papers also linked Alhazmi and Almihdhar to Moussaoui’s flight training efforts. [USA Today, 1/30/02] But the FBI agents pursuing the case were prevented by top officials at FBI headquarters from securing the needed search warrant to look through Moussaoui’s belongings. [Time, 5/21/02] Additionally, phone numbers found among his papers linked him to Ramzi Binalshibh, another participant in the January 2000 Malaysian meeting. The numbers would have also led investigators to Atta and the other hijackers Binalshibh was living with in Germany—had they been able to access Moussaoui’s possessions. [Associated Press, 12/12/01]

    ...

    On July 10, 2001, Phoenix FBI agent Ken Williams wrote a memo to FBI headquarters, warning of the possibility that bin Laden’s followers were attending US flight schools in preparation for terrorist attacks. [New York Times, 6/3/02] His fears were based on his own observations at the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Arizona where he believed some of the students had ties to al-Qaeda. [New York Times, 5/21/02] While the memo did not mention any of the hijackers, it did refer to someone who was closely associated with Hanjour. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/24/02] Williams suggested investigating flight schools more closely, but this was not done, not even in Arizona. [New York Times, 5/04/02] Had the FBI followed through on this advice, it is almost certain that the name Nawaf Alhazmi would have been noticed by FBI criminal investigators after the “all points bulletin” was issued on August 23. Furthermore, it is now known that shortly after Almihdhar reentered the US on July 4, 2001, he flew from New York to Arizona to meet with Hanjour and Alhazmi. Had Almihdhar’s movements been tracked, the plot involving flight training would have been exposed almost immediately, at about the same time Ken Williams released his memo. [Die Zeit, 10/1/02]

    ...

    The bulletin also requested that Khallad bin Atash be added to the watch list—eight months after he was determined to have been the main planner of the Cole bombing. One other person from the Malaysian meeting was also included, but that name remains confidential (could it be Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11?). [New York Times, 9/21/02]

    ...

    For instance, up until June 2002, the CIA maintained that it had not learned of Almihdhar’s connections to al-Qaeda or his visits to the US until August 2001. [New York Times, 6/3/02] But as is well-known now, these links had been established by US intelligence before the January 2000 meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. If it had not been for leaks and the diligent work of investigative journalists, this information would never have made it to the public. Another example of their tendency to misrepresent the truth was made apparent when the FBI claimed it had begun “an aggressive, ‘full field’ investigation” immediately after the August 23 bulletin. But to the embarrassment of the FBI, it was discovered that the agency did not conduct even the simplest and most basic of searches, neglecting to check national databases of bank records, credit card records, and so on. [Newsweek, 6/2/02] The CIA and FBI’s inability to concur on whether or not the August 23 warning was labeled “immediate” is another case in point.

    ...

    The most serious questions have not even been asked by the Congressional committee. What does FBI informant Abdussattar Shaikh really know? Why does he contradict neighbors’ claims that Mohamed Atta was a frequent visitor to his house? Who do phone records show Alhazmi and Almihdhar called so frequently? Was there a deliberate sabotage of John O’Neill’s investigation in Yemen? Why did the CIA fail to share information on Alhazmi and Almihdhar? Why were even well known, top level terrorists like Khallad bin Atash not put on watch lists, much less investigated? Could the meetings in late night limousines have been the communication link between the hijackers and some group outside of al-Qaeda? Do we really know the true identities of the hijackers? Why can’t we see the video footage of them passing through airport security? Why does the FBI still use a photo of an innocent man for Salem Alhazmi? Is there any reason to believe Khalid Almihdhar is still alive?

    Most importantly, at what point do incompetence and bureaucratic barriers cease to be reasonable explanations for so many failures surrounding Alhazmi and Almihdhar? Could the US government have been protecting these two for some reason? When will investigators and the media start asking these difficult questions?

    Posted 7 years ago #
  2. truthmod
    Administrator

    Is There More to the Capture of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Than Meets the Eye?
    http://www.historycommons.org/essay.jsp?article=es...

    Sept. 11's Smoking Gun: The Many Faces of Saeed Sheikh
    http://www.historycommons.org/essay.jsp?article=es...

    The Failure to Defend the Skies on 9/11
    http://www.historycommons.org/essay.jsp?article=es...

    Posted 7 years ago #

Reply

You must log in to post.